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RESPECTING LEGISLATORS AND REJECTING
BASELINES: REBALANCING CASEY
Paul C. Quast*
INTRODUCTION
In the last three years state legislatures have written and passed a torrent
of abortion regulations across the United States.1 These laws have come as
pro-life politicians have taken control of many states’ legislatures and executive offices.2 Other contributing factors in this trend may include an
increased number of people who define themselves as pro-life3 and the exposure of bad actors within the abortion industry whose practices have led some
to question the safety of current abortion practices.4 Needless to say, many
* B.A., Religion, 2010, Colorado College; J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Notre Dame Law
School. I would like to especially thank my Note advisor, Gerard Bradley, for his assistance
and support in writing this Note.
1 See 2012 Saw Second-Highest Number of Abortion Restrictions Ever, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2013/01/02/; AUL’s 2013
Life List: Mapping the Momentum Toward a Pro-Life America, AMS. UNITED FOR LIFE, http://
www.aul.org/auls-life-list-2013/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2014); Monthly State Update: Major
Developments in 2014, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/updates/index.html; Mailee R. Smith, 2011 State Legislative Report, AMS. UNITED
FOR LIFE, http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/state-legislative.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2014);.
2 See Michael Barone, The Depth & Breadth of GOP Victories, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Nov.
8, 2010), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/11/08/gop_poised_to_reap_re
districting_rewards_107871.html (discussing the takeover by republicans during the 2010
election); Huma Khan, Will Redistricting Be a Bloodbath for Democrats?, ABC NEWS (Nov. 4,
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/republicans-historic-win-state-legislatures-vote2010-election/story?id=12049040 (“Republicans took control of at least 19 Democraticcontrolled state legislatures Tuesday and gained more than 650 seats, according to the
National Conference of State Legislatures.”). But see Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock
Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107 (2013) (discussing congressional gridlock in Washington, D.C.).
3 See Guy Benson, Gallup: 58 Percent of Americans Oppose All or Most Abortions,
TOWNHALL.COM (May 10, 2013), http://townhall.com/tipsheet/guybenson/2013/05/10/
gallup-58-percent-of-americans-oppose-all-or-most-abortions-n1592505; Lydia Saad, More
Americans “Pro-Life” than “Pro-Choice” for First Time, GALLUP (May 15, 2009), http://www.gal
lup.com/poll/118399/more-americans-pro-life-than-pro-choice-first-time.aspx.
4 See Abortion Doc Guilty in Woman’s Death, CBS NEWS (Feb. 20, 2001), http://www
.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-273313.html; Jon Hurdle, Doctor Starts His Life Term in Grisly
Abortion Clinic Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16/us/
913
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states have entered a bold era of regulations of abortion facilities, driving the
market price for an abortion in many states to a level that puts many clinics
out of business.5
Pro-life legislators and policymakers have developed and passed a variety
of regulations, including stricter building codes for abortion clinics,6 hospital
admitting privilege requirements for abortion practitioners,7 increased waitkermit-gosnell-abortion-doctor-gets-life-term.html?_r=0; Helen Pow, Second ‘House of Horrors’ Abortion Clinic Where Doctor ‘Twisted Heads off Fetus’ Necks with His Bare Hands’ is Investigated in Texas, DAILY MAIL (May 16, 2013, 5:24 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2325786/Douglas-Karpen-Second-house-horrors-abortion-clinic-investigated-Texas
.html; see also Samuel W. Calhoun, Stopping Philadelphia Abortion Provider Kermit Gosnell and
Preventing Others Like Him: An Outcome That Both Pro-Choicers and Pro-Lifers Should Support, 57
VILL. L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the recent atrocities of the abortion doctor Kermit Gosnell). But see Clarke D. Forsythe & Bradley N. Kehr, A Road Map Through the Supreme Court’s
Back Alley, 57 VILL. L. REV. 45, 46 (2012) (criticizing Professor Calhoun’s proposals for
stopping “future Gosnells”).
5 See, e.g., Laura Basset, Planned Parenthood to Close Three Texas Clinics, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 18, 2013, 1:01 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/18/plannedparenthood-texas-_n_3617299.html (discussing recent closure of abortion clinics as a result
of new restrictions); Amanda Peterson Beadle, Mississippi’s Only Abortion Clinic Could Be
Forced to Close in January, THINKPROGRESS (Nov. 28, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://thinkprogress
.org/health/2012/11/28/1252261/mississippis-only-abortion-clinic-could-be-forced-toclose-in-january/ (same); Susan Berry, Abortion Clinics Closing at Record Rate Nationwide,
BREITBART (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/09/16/
Abortion-Clinics-Closing-At-Record-Rate-Nationwide (same); Esmé E. Deprez, Abortion
Clinics Close at Record Pace After States Tighten Rules, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 3, 2013, 8:52 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-03/abortion-clinics-close-at-record-pace-afterstates-tighten-rules.html (same); Celina Durgin, Stricter Standards Force Virginia’s Busiest
Abortion Clinic to Close, WASH. TIMES (July 15, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2013/jul/15/stricter-standards-force-virginias-busiest-abortio/?page=all (same); Darrel Rowland & Alex Felser, More Ohio Abortion Clinics Closing, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Oct. 16,
2013, 6:48 PM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/10/16/1016-abortion-clinics-closing.html (same); Cheryl Sullenger, 44 Abortion Clinics Closed in 2013 as Two
More Close in Cleveland, Montana, LIFENEWS.COM (Sept. 20, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://www
.lifenews.com/2013/09/20/44-abortion-clinics-closed-in-2013-as-two-close-in-clevelandmontana/ (same).
6 See, e.g., Kathy Lohr, Clinics Close as Texas Abortion Fight Continues, NPR (Oct. 25,
2013, 3:27 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/25/240547579/clinics-close-as-texas-abortion-fight-continues (discussing the effect of new building codes on abortion providers);
Rachel Weiner & Antonio Olivo, Challenge to Stricter Regulations for Virginia Abortion Clinics
Moves Forward, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-1009/local/42862546_1_virginia-board-abortion-clinics-terry-mcauliffe (same). But see Tom
Ciesielka, California Governor Brown’s New Laws Endanger Women, CROSSMAP (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://crossmap.christianpost.com/news/california-governor-browns-new-laws-endangerwomen-6131 (discussing a provision that would remove certain building code requirements in California).
7 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-cv-465-wmc, 2013 WL
3989238, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2013) aff’d, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2841 (2014) (noting that plaintiff physicians did not have hospital admitting privileges within thirty miles of the clinic).
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ing periods,8 and restrictions on the use of medical abortions.9 Judicial
responses to these regulations have been mixed, though largely negative.10
Despite the diversity of state abortion regulations, these laws are subject to
scrutiny under the standard set forth in Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey.11 Scholars and judges on all sides of the abortion issue view
the undue burden standard developed in Casey as fraught with ambiguity and
uncertainty, with an untold number of law review articles, cases, and books
attempting to interpret it.12 Perhaps because of the contentious nature and
stakes of interpreting this standard, no consensus has arisen to allow for a
unified understanding of what “undue burden” means.13 As a result, judges’
and justices’ attempts at utilizing the undue burden standard have been
erratic, often yielding conflicting results from state to state and circuit to circuit.14 The Supreme Court has done little to clarify its previous holdings in
this matter.15
This Note will investigate ways in which judges analyze the cost and
accessibility of abortion services after implementation of these new state reg8 Kate Pickert, What Missouri’s New Abortion Law Means for Women, TIME (Sept. 11,
2014), http://time.com/3329253/missouri-abortion-law-waiting-period/.
9 A medical abortion uses prescription medication to facilitate the termination of the
fetus, as opposed to a surgical abortion, where the fetus is destroyed using surgical instruments and is removed at the hospital or other facility. Many of the statutes limiting the use
or sale of the medical abortion drug RU-486 have been held unconstitutional. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.123 (West 2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-729a (West 2014).
10 See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F.
Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (striking down an admitting privileges provision in a statute while upholding others), rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014); see also Van Hollen,
2013 WL 3989238; Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (M.D.
Ala. 2013); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D. Miss. 2013)
aff’d as modified, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014).
11 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12 See, e.g., Abbott, 748 F.3d at 588 (noting the debate around the level of scrutiny
applied to abortion cases); Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion
Regulations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285 (2013) (same); Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are
Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867
(1994) (same); Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis
Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48. HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 279 (2013) (same); Ania
O. Wlodek, Note, Legal Does Not Mean Rational: The Practicality of Treating First-Trimester Abortion Clinics the Same as Hospitals, 18 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 395, 404 (2012) (same).
13 See, e.g., Lucy E. Hill, Seeking Liberty’s Refuge: Analyzing Legislative Purpose Under
Casey’s Undue Burden Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 365 (2012) (addressing the divide in
how courts address purpose-based challenges under the Casey standard).
14 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) (“What that burden consists of in
the specific context of abortion statutes has been a subject of some question.”); compare
Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the
result of increased travel distances renders the law unconstitutional), with Women’s Med.
Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 605 (6th Cir. 2006) (concluding that the result of
increased travel distances does not render the law unconstitutional), and Greenville
Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 171–72 (4th Cir. 2000) (same).
15 See Carhart, 550 U.S. 124; Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
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ulations in determining whether the new regulations constitute an undue
burden. In the absence of a clear Supreme Court ruling that defines what
constitutes an “undue burden” under these new regulations, judges are
forced to determine inconsistent “baselines” of cost and accessibility that constitute a misreading of Casey. For example, a judge may reason that a certain
number of women are likely to seek abortions in the coming year in their
state, and that a certain percentage of those will not end up being able to
access that service if a regulation goes into effect. The number of potential
abortions may decrease in response to increased cost of abortions—determined in light of travel time to alternate states or locations for abortion services, or other barriers that deter a woman from seeking an abortion. The
judge then makes a determination of whether that interference is “undue.”
What results is an arbitrary ruling based on hypothetical percentages: while
one judge might find that a twenty percent decrease in the number of abortions means the regulation is constitutional because it does not impose an
undue burden, another judge might estimate that a similar regulation will
result in a sixty percent decrease in the number of abortions and therefore is
an undue burden. This Note will refer to these judicial estimates as “baselines,” which is an appropriate term because judges often treat the number of
clinics or number of abortions that occur in a state at a given time as a kind
of benchmark from which they are not willing to depart. The fundamental
issue with this trend is that restricting access to abortion itself does not necessarily constitute an undue burden.
As this Note will show, the current market demand for abortions in a
particular state should not drive the Casey undue burden standard. Rather,
the Casey standard seeks to balance the competing interests of a woman’s
constitutional right to an abortion with the state’s legitimate interest in protecting both maternal health and promoting life.16 While pro-choice advocates and certain judges will promote a view of Casey that looks only to the
number of women prevented access to abortion services or the number of
clinics shut down, the Supreme Court has never ruled that there is anything
sacrosanct about the current or projected number of abortions in the undue
burden calculation. The unreliability and sheer guesswork of these numbers
aside, no precedent supports judges seeking to set or maintain these baselines, and these judges commit extreme judicial error when they do so.
Subjective determinations of what constitutes an undue burden under
Casey will have implications beyond the confines of the specific case at bar.
By stating unconstitutional baseline minimums of acceptable abortion access,
16 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872, 878 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)
(“[T]he Constitution does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes,
from expressing a preference for normal childbirth.” (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 162–64 (1973); see also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157 (“The government may use its
voice and its regulatory authority to show its profound respect for the life within the
woman.”); Id. at 145 (“[T]he government has a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life . . . .”).
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courts will confuse the public, litigators, legislators, and other judges by
improperly determining the proper inputs into the undue burden analysis.
Unclear statements of the law additionally mean less persuasive precedent,17
which undermines the courts’ ability to uphold the rule of law. Particularly
in the realm of abortion cases and the Casey balancing test, improper use or
abuse of the standard allows courts to set precedents that will lead to a cycle
of confused reasoning in later important and divisive cases. If courts regularly abuse the discretion given by Casey, they influence future courts’ abilities to similarly abuse Casey and unconstitutionally deprive the states of their
legitimate rights and the deference they deserve.
Part I of this Note describes the background cases leading to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Casey and the resulting undue burden standard.
This Part also explains the limited circumstances in which the undue burden
standard gives more definitive guidelines for judicial decisionmaking. Part II
works through several federal district and appellate court cases to identify
some of the underlying baseline presumptions and normative value judgments influencing judicial decisions in this area of the law. These baselines
are often dispositive in determining whether a restriction on abortion is due
or undue, cutting against the goodwill attempts by legislatures to make abortion as safe as possible while adhering to the Supreme Court’s constitutional
protection of the procedure. Importantly, this Note does not impute upon
judges any bad faith or malfeasance in relation to their adjudications in this
area, but rather seeks to emphasize the inherent vagueness of the undue
burden standard.18 Part III analyzes the impropriety of judicially created
baselines and calls judges to account more clearly for their values on these
matters when using the undue burden standard.
As a threshold matter, this Note does not support the undue burden
standard as stated in Casey. While the use of a balancing test in important
and controversial constitutional matters may be appropriate at times, the
underlying premise of the Casey undue burden standard is deeply flawed.
While at once stating that women should be free to decide when life
begins,19 the Court demands that for all states an unborn child is only a
potential life, rather than an actual life, and establishes the balancing test
using those unwavering parameters. States should have the authority to
decide that a fetus, as an unquestionably distinct member of the human species,20 is a person whose full value needs to be balanced against the liberty
17 See generally Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189 (2014) (analyzing the ways that the Court attempts
to ameliorate prior judicial error).
18 See infra Part III.
19 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (“At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”).
20 See PATRICK LEE, ABORTION AND UNBORN HUMAN LIFE 1–5 (1996); see also Robert P.
George, Embryo Ethics: Justice and Nascent Human Life, 17 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (discussing the arguments against the proposition that human life begins at conception).
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interests of his or her mother. Such a standard would both allow state
lawmakers who value unborn human life to make laws to properly defend it,
while giving other states the freedom to deny the personhood and value of
the unborn or instead identify situations where liberty interests are deemed
more valuable than life.
I.

FROM ROE TO CASEY: THE JOURNEY FROM STRICT SCRUTINY
TO UNDUE BURDEN
A.

The Fundamental Right to Abortion: Roe v. Wade

Abortion shifted from a predominately state-centered issue to a strongly
federal matter with the 1973 Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade.21 Roe
sought to resolve the constitutionality of a Texas statute that prohibited abortion at all stages except in circumstances where abortion was necessary to
save the mother’s life.22 Following the constitutional reasoning of privacy
cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut,23 Eisenstadt v. Baird,24 Loving v. Virginia,25 Meyer v. Nebraska,26 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,27 the Court held that
women have a fundamental right to abortion.28 Limiting access to this right
via regulation required a “compelling state interest” with the regulation “narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”29 Courts
would be required to analyze abortion regulations using the rigorous strict
scrutiny standard.30 This right was only fully unrestricted during the first
trimester when the mortality rate from abortion was lower than the mortality
rate in normal childbirth.31 After the first trimester the state could regulate
abortion to the extent necessary to protect “maternal health.”32 Only after
viability could the states make regulatory efforts to protect the fetal life.33
Regulations to protect unborn fetal life could go so far as to prohibit all abortion after viability, “except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother.”34 By raising the issue of abortion to the federal level, Roe
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See generally Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007) (analyzing the complex history and jurisprudential reaction to the Roe v. Wade decision).
22 Roe, 410 U.S. at 117–18.
23 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
24 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972).
25 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
26 262 U.S. 390, 392 (1923).
27 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
28 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–66 (1973).
29 Id. at 155–56.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 163.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 163–64.
34 Id.; see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (stating with regard to the health
exception that “medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors—physical,
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pushed the abortion issue to the fore of the national consciousness and
sparked a debate that continues to rage today.
B.

Intermediary Cases: City of Akron, Thornburgh, and Webster

Between Roe and Casey, the Supreme Court considered a number of
cases regarding abortion, each time reaffirming the fundamental holding of
Roe.35 Three of these cases, in particular, demonstrate the development of
the undue burden standard. Importantly, the meaning behind what constitutes an undue burden shifts throughout these cases, and none of the three
cases sets forth a definitive definition in its holding.
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,36 the Court
declared unconstitutional regulations requiring (1) that all second-trimester
abortions take place in a hospital, (2) parental consent, (3) informed consent, (4) a 24-hour waiting period, and (5) “humane” disposal of fetuses.37
Although the majority opinion used the term “significant obstacle” when discussing the hospitalization requirement, it did not mention “undue burden.”38 In her dissent, however, Justice O’Connor argued against the
trimester theory of Roe, saying that it cannot be accommodated under “sound
constitutional theory.”39 O’Connor linked the undue burden standard back
to previous Supreme Court abortion cases and wrote “[i]n my view, this
‘unduly burdensome’ standard should be applied to the challenged regulations throughout the entire pregnancy without reference to the particular
‘stage’ of pregnancy involved.”40 She concluded by expounding that abortion regulations should be acceptable if they rationally relate to a “legitimate
state purpose,” so long as they do not “unduly burden” the fundamental right
to abortion.41 Her statements in Akron set the initial groundwork for the
Casey undue burden standard, even if they did not clarify its meaning.
Dealing with a statute equivalent to the one in Akron, the Court similarly
held the regulations at issue in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists42 to be unconstitutional under Roe. Again, Justice
O’Connor dissented from the majority opinion, retaining her views from
Akron that the applicable standard should involve an undue burden analyemotional, psychological, familial, and the woman’s age—relevant to the well-being of the
patient. All these factors may relate to health.”).
35 For a more thorough analysis of Akron, Thornburgh, and Webster, see Freeman, supra
note 12, at 288–89.
36 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
37 Id. at 451–52.
38 Id. at 434.
39 Id. at 452 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
40 Id. at 453.
41 Id. (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) (alteration omitted)).
42 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
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sis.43 She wrote: “[J]udicial scrutiny of state regulation of abortion should be
limited to whether the state law bears a rational relationship to legitimate
purposes such as the advancement of these compelling interests, with heightened scrutiny reserved for instances in which the State has imposed an
‘undue burden’ on the abortion decision.”44 The compelling interests she
referenced were “ensuring maternal health and . . . protecting potential
human life.”45 Under Justice O’Connor’s proposed analysis in Thornburgh,
courts would allow all regulations to stand that rationally relate to a legitimate state purpose, including protecting the health of the mother and fetus,
unless the burden on the woman was undue.46 If the Court finds that an
undue burden does exist, it would then use a more “exacting standard of
review” in its constitutional analysis.47
Unlike Akron and Thornburgh, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services the
Court held that a statutory ban on the use of public resources for performance of certain abortions was not contrary to the Constitution.48 Again, by
finding that the law would not pose an undue burden, O’Connor wrote in
her concurrence that a provision requiring an examination and tests to
determine viability is constitutional.49 Her concurring opinion did not yield
a different result from the majority, which merely asked whether the law reasonably related to a legitimate state purpose—here a legitimate interest that
an abortion not be performed on a viable fetus—and therefore found the
tests to be constitutional.50 Just three years later, the Court would decide
Casey, and O’Connor would get her chance to more fully assert the undue
burden standard.
C.

The Undue Burden Standard: Planned Parenthood v. Casey

Casey primarily involved an analysis of five provisions of the 1988 and
1989 amendments to the Pennsylvania abortion statute.51 In a highly divided
Court, a three-justice joint opinion, led by Justice O’Connor, rejected Roe’s
trimester framework52 and adopted the undue burden standard.53 Mindful
of cultural reliance on access to abortion services, the joint opinion reaffirmed the central holding of Roe54 while also injecting into the constitu43 Id. at 828 (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 459–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
44 Id. (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 461–63 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
45 Id. (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 461 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
46 Id. (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 461–64 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
47 Id. (citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 467 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)).
48 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989).
49 Id. at 530 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 520 (majority opinion).
51 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
52 Id. at 873.
53 Id. at 878.
54 Id. at 856, 860, 864–65 (majority opinion). Though whether the central holding of
Roe was beyond the trimester framework is questionable, it appears that the court intended
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tional balance the “life of the fetus that may become a child” throughout the
length of the pregnancy.55 Viability would again be the dividing line, with all
laws restricting abortion before viability being subject to the undue burden
standard, while leaving states free to regulate or even prohibit abortion after
viability.56 Additionally, a state could create regulations designed to “foster
the health of a woman seeking an abortion” throughout the pregnancy as
long as “they do not constitute an undue burden.”57 Using the language
from Akron, the joint opinion stated, “undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.”58 Absent such a substantial obstacle, a state regulation that “reasonably relate[s]” to expressing “profound respect for the life of the unborn”
should be upheld.59 Additionally, the joint opinion made clear:
The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at
the right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or more
expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it. Only
where state regulation imposes an undue burden on a woman’s ability to
make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of the
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.60

In so stating, the Court indicated that incidental effects, such as
increased cost in seeking abortion services, would not be sufficient to find a
state regulation unconstitutional: that law must have the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman seeking an abortion to
be found unconstitutional. Unfortunately, what makes a law meet the definition of a “substantial obstacle” is unclear.61 Some guiding principles are
nonetheless enunciated: “[w]hat is at stake is the woman’s right to make the
ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.”62
Applying the undue burden standard, the Court upheld four amendments63 to the Pennsylvania abortion statute, while striking down the spousal
notification requirement as unconstitutional.64 The Court’s application of
the undue burden standard to each of these provisions provides minimal guidance to the meaning of substantial obstacle, although a few potential referto affirm the idea that abortion is a fundamental right. What it meant for abortion to be a
fundamental right, however, was clearly changed.
55 Id. at 846.
56 Id. (stating that a law which prohibits abortion after viability is permissible so long
as it “contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health”).
57 Id. at 878 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
58 Id. at 877.
59 Id. at 877–78.
60 Id. at 874.
61 See infra Part III.
62 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
63 These included an informed consent provision with a 24-hour wait period; a parental consent provision with a judicial bypass procedure; a definition of medical emergency;
and certain reporting requirements for abortion providers. Id. at 880, 887, 899, 900.
64 Id. at 895, 901.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL211.txt

922

unknown

Seq: 10

notre dame law review

30-DEC-14

14:18

[vol. 90:2

ence points are established. For example, in upholding the 24-hour waiting
period between being informed of the risks of abortions and the actual procedure, the Court apparently creates a lower limit on what makes an acceptable wait time for an abortion procedure.65 Similarly, the Court’s finding
that the informed consent provision is constitutional likely creates an amount
of information that abortion doctors can be required to give in all circumstances.66 On the other hand, the finding that the spousal notification provision creates an undue burden likely sets an upper limit on those kinds of
regulations,67 so that any similar or stricter kind of spousal notification or
consent provision would also be found unconstitutional. The same logic
could likely be used for the other holdings in Casey,68 though this could be
somewhat complicated by the fact that similar provisions may produce varying burdens in different states.69
D.

Supreme Court Decisions Since Casey

Since Casey the Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to speak on
abortion several times, though it has made no move to overturn either the
essential holding of Roe or the undue burden standard established in Casey.
Instead, the Supreme Court has applied the fact-intensive undue burden
inquiry in several cases, with different results. In the 1997 decision of Mazurek v. Armstrong,70 the court upheld the constitutionality of a provision requiring that abortions be performed by physicians.71 The law at issue in this case
was unique in that there was only one licensed non-physician abortion practitioner in the entire state of Montana.72 Since this law applied to only one
practitioner, the court determined that it would barely make any difference
in the availability of abortion in Montana.73 Despite the prevalence of “physician only” abortion laws,74 the holding in this case did not go far in clarifying
the undue burden standard. Indeed, the Supreme Court had upheld the
constitutionality of such laws prior to Casey,75 and the unique circumstances
65 See id. at 885.
66 Id. at 882. But see id. (requiring that the information be “truthful and not
misleading”).
67 Id. at 895.
68 See supra notes 63–64.
69 For example, a 24-hour wait period in Texas may require a woman to take a second
round trip to an abortion facility which is substantially further and more expensive than
the same 24-hour wait period requirement in Rhode Island. For more analysis of this issue,
see infra Part III.
70 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
71 Id. at 974–75. Again, the issue is raised whether such a provision would be valid in a
state where requiring that only physicians perform abortions creates a much greater burden than the one that resulted in Mazurek.
72 Id. at 971.
73 Id. at 973–74.
74 See id. at 969 (“Similar rules exist in 40 other States in the Nation.”).
75 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (“The State may define the term ‘physician,’
as it has been employed in the preceding paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to
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of Montana in 1999 as only having one non-physician abortion provider limited the decision’s precedential effects.
In Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), the Court held a Nebraska statute
prohibiting partial birth abortions unconstitutional.76 The majority of that
court held the Nebraska law would effectively bar a broad range of abortion
procedures, making it much more difficult to receive an abortion in the second trimester77 and creating an undue burden on women.78 However, in
the 2007 decision of Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.79 The
distinction the Court drew in this case was that the Act was not so vague as to
create a chilling effect on as broad a range of procedures as the law at issue
in Carhart I, therefore it did not cause the same undue burden.80 The pair of
cases likely creates upper and lower limits on the amount of permissible regulation in the area of undue burden, giving lower courts clear notice that
restrictions such as the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act will be upheld, while
anything creating a burden equal or greater to that in Carhart I, at least in the
context of partial birth abortion, will be struck down.81
mean only a physician currently licensed by the State, and may proscribe any abortion by a
person who is not a physician as so defined.”).
76 530 U.S. 914, 945–46 (2000).
77 The second trimester occurs between weeks 12–24 of a pregnancy and includes
both periods of time where the fetus is viable and where the fetus is not viable. Id. at 924,
930.
78 Id. at 945–46. The main problem with the Nebraska statute was that although it was
intended to target only to ban “dilation and extraction” procedures, it would also apply to
and subject abortion doctors to the penalties for the far more common “dilation and evacuation” procedure. Id. at 943–46.
79 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007); see 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2012).
80 Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 151–52. The Court distinguished from Carhart I by noting the
presence of anatomical landmarks, which had the effect of giving abortion doctors objective standards. Combined with a scienter requirement, the court was satisfied that the
statute would not have chilling effects on doctors performing other types of abortion procedures. Id. at 149 (“Unlike the statutory language in [Carhart I] that prohibited the delivery of a ‘substantial portion’ of the fetus—where a doctor might question how much of the
fetus is a substantial portion—the Act defines the line between potentially criminal conduct on the one hand and lawful abortion on the other.” (citing Carhart I, 530 U.S. at
922)). The Court was also concerned with the “integrity and ethics of the medical profession” and the devaluation of human life. Id. at 157 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 731 (1997)). However, that reasoning has had little traction in other contexts as
it would seem to apply to basically any abortion procedure, all of which “perverts the birth
process” and devalues human life. Id. at 129, 157.
81 The precedential value of this information will likely be limited due to the unique
issues surrounding partial birth abortion. For example, clear guidelines in the realm of
partial birth abortion are unlikely to influence a court’s reasoning regarding hospital
admissions requirements for abortion practitioners. Additionally, as a federal statute, the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act likely would preempt the need for any state to pass a ban on
the same kind of statutes.
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II. CASEY APPLIED: THE BASELINES GUIDING JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING
Since the Casey decision in 1992, the federal courts have had to handle a
steady flow of challenges to state regulations restricting abortions.82 This
Part investigates several recent cases in this area to analyze the underlying
value judgments that judges bring to the bench in setting baselines and
determining if an undue burden exists. It is appropriate to focus on the
particular cases that this Part analyzes because they represent either a major
circuit court decision on the matter or have been decided within the last two
years and deal with the most recent wave of state legislative restrictions on
abortion. These cases reflect that the undue burden has not been applied
consistently across jurisdictions because the lack of a clear definition permits
judges to impose differing personal values in their evaluation of the law.
While state legislatures are free to allow different values to drive their laws,
the uniform values of the Constitution should apply everywhere equally. At a
minimum, we should demand that they apply similarly in all jurisdictions.
After explaining that the poorly defined undue burden standard does not
live up to these expectations, Part III will identify some of the key areas where
these courts went wrong, or got it right, in an effort to encourage the courts
to adjudicate along these lines in the future.
A.

The Baseline Fixation: Okpalobi v. Foster

Many courts decide undue burden cases on the basis of the current availability of access to abortion and the reduction in abortions that will likely
take place if a particular restriction goes into effect. Okpalobi v. Foster83 dealt
with two Louisiana statutes84 that would have made “[a]ny person who performs an abortion . . . liable to the mother of the unborn child for any damage occasioned or precipitated by the abortion.”85 Such damages could not
be limited by waiver however, as when read in conjunction with another law
the regulation would “ensure that a physician cannot insulate himself from
liability by advising a woman of the risks, physical or mental, associated with
abortion.”86 According to the court, opening abortion practitioners up to
such great liability would have put eighty percent of the state’s abortion providers out of business.87
The court analyzed the statute by examining both its purpose and
effect.88 Interpreting Casey, the court concluded that if either the purpose
82 In addition to some state restrictions, see Carhart II, 550 U.S. at 168 (upholding the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1531).
83 190 F.3d 337 (5th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir.
2001) (en banc) (reversing and remanding on procedural grounds).
84 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12 (West 2013); Woman’s Right to Know Act, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6 (West 2013), invalidated by Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 337.
85 Okpalobi, 190 F.3d at 356 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.12(A)).
86 Id. at 357.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 354–57.
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or effect of the statute “place[s] a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability,”89 an undue burden
exists and the restriction is unconstitutional.90 Although the court was skeptical of the legislature’s purpose in passing this law, the court did not need to
decide that Louisiana’s given purpose was a “sham.”91 Rather, the court
found the provisions unconstitutional by examining the effect of the statute.92
Under review for clear error, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s
holding that the provision “ ‘sets a standard no physician can meet and creates a climate in which no provider can possibly operate,’ thereby significantly reducing the number of abortion providers in Louisiana.”93
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “[a] measure that has the effect
of forcing all or a substantial portion of a state’s abortion providers to stop
offering such procedures creates a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to
have a pre-viability abortion, thus constituting an undue burden under
Casey.”94 Combined with the vagueness of the statute, the court came to the
conclusion that the statute was unconstitutional “in its entirety.”95
The Okpalobi court’s critical basis for its finding—that eighty percent of
the state’s abortion providers would be forced to cease performing abortions
should the law go into effect—lacks the essential weight for the finding of an
undue burden.96 While the provisions at issue undoubtedly placed a burden
on abortion practitioners in the form of substantial medical liability, a finding of an undue burden requires more than a simple statement of a decrease
in the number of abortions.97 A bill providing free childcare, healthcare,
food, clothing, entertainment, and housing for all children in a state may
make live childbirth a more appealing option and thus decrease the number
of abortions, perhaps even putting some abortion doctors out of business,
but would not place an undue burden on women’s access to abortion services. Likewise, a statute like the one at issue in Okpalobi, which increases the
availability of remedies for harms caused by an abortion procedure, may not
be undue simply because it decreases the availability of abortions in a state. A
finding of unconstitutionality requires either that there be no rational basis
for the law or that a court, accounting for the policy deference given to the
state, has found the burden undue.98 The fundamental error that the
Okpalobi court makes is its failure to balance the potential need for this statute against the potential burden placed on women seeking abortions. In so
89 Id. at 354 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878
(1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 357.
93 Id. (quoting Okpalobi v. Foster, 981 F. Supp. 977, 983–84 (E.D. La. 1998)).
94 Id.
95 Id. at 361.
96 Id. at 357.
97 See infra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
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doing, the court betrays its policy preference for more open access to abortion, relying simply on a decrease in the availability of abortion providers,
rather than following the balancing test mandated by Casey. It is possible that
the Okpalobi court simply sought to maintain the same number of abortion
providers as were present at the time the legislature created the statute, but
there is no precedent that supports that policy preference. By establishing
their baseline (the current number and availability of abortions) and refusing to balance the policy preferences of the elected lawmakers of the state
(reducing the number of abortion providers to only those willing to accept
increased potential liability for their medical services), the court strays from
the requirements of Casey.
B.

The Burden-Only Analysis: Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier99

Some courts treat the Casey analysis as a simple “search for burdens”
rather than a balancing test to determine whether those burdens are undue.
In Jackson Women’s Health Organization v. Currier, the only abortion clinic in
Mississippi challenged a statute requiring that “all physicians associated with
abortion clinics have admitting and staff privileges at a local hospital and be
board certified.”100 Given that the case was in the preliminary injunction
stage, with the clinic looking for a preliminary injunction of the law, the
court had to determine whether the clinic had a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits.101 If the court found that the clinic had a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits along with three other factors,102 it would
grant the preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the law until the
issues could be decided in an administrative hearing.103
In its as-applied constitutional analysis, the Southern District of Mississippi initially pointed out that the clinic’s physicians would not be able to
receive the required admitting privileges, resulting in the closure of the only
remaining abortion clinic in the state.104 Among its defenses, Mississippi
raised the possibility that if the clinic shuts down, women could always travel
to the “at least four abortion facilities ranging from 121 to 209 miles from
99 See Emily Wagster Pettus, Jackson Women’s Health Organization, Mississippi’s Sole
Abortion Clinic, May Not Survive, HUFFINGTON POST (July 14, 2012, 10:45 AM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/14/mississippi-abortion-acce_n_1673241.html.
100 940 F. Supp. 2d 416, 417 (S.D. Miss. 2013).
101 Id. at 418.
102 Id. (“To obtain [the relief of a preliminary injunction], Plaintiffs must demonstrate
four familiar requirements: (1) [a] substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) [a]
substantial threat that plaintiff[s] will suffer irreparable injury; (3) [that the] injury outweighs any harm the injunction might cause the defendant[s]; and (4) [that the] injunction is in the public interest.” (citing Women’s Med. Ctr. of Nw. Hous. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411,
419 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001))).
103 Id.
104 Id. at 420–21.
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Jackson,” requiring a few more hours of travel to an out-of-state provider,
which does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional undue burden.105
The question, the court states, is whether the increased difficulty of
access to abortion rises to the level of a “substantial obstacle.”106 Interpreting dicta from Mazurek, the court determined that extra travel time could be
a factor in determining whether a law places a substantial obstacle on women
seeking an abortion.107 From this, the court distinguished the present case
from others in which women were forced to drive further in order to seek an
abortion by the fact that this case involved the closure of a clinic, the possibility of the need to travel to another state, and the large amount of traveling
required.108 Ultimately, in light of the combination of these factors, the
court held that the plaintiff-clinic had a substantial likelihood of success on
the merits in its undue burden claim.109
A number of factors weighing in favor of the state’s arguments are missing from the constitutional analysis in Currier. Leaving out such factors
makes it impossible to decide whether the burden is “undue,” as the court
does not balance the legitimate purposes of the regulation against the obstacles resulting from the rule. The first error occurs when the court fails to
mention Mississippi’s legitimate interest in protecting the life and health of
women seeking an abortion.110 The court quickly dismisses the possibility of
the state’s interest in protecting the unborn:
Casey reaffirmed the state’s “legitimate interests from the outset of the
pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus
that may become a child.” Yet contrary to the State’s current position, the
Supreme Court did not stop there, noting that “a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has
the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”111

The court’s discussion of a state’s interest in promoting birth over abortion or protecting the life of a fetus ends there. That kind of one-sided constitutional analysis could swiftly lead to absurd results. For example, a law
requiring all abortion medical instruments to be cleaned prior to reuse
105 Id. at 421. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling on the
ground that “the undue burden analysis focuses solely on the effects within the regulating
state,” so that Mississippi could not rely on other states to provide its citizens with a constitutional right. Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 13-60599, 2014 WL 3730467,
at *9 (5th Cir. July 29, 2014).
106 Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 421.
107 Id. at 421–22. Additional driving time is regularly cited as a burden on women
seeking an abortion. See infra notes 116–23 and accompanying text.
108 Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
109 Id. at 423.
110 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (joint opinion
of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (stating that regulations designed to protect the
life and health of women seeking abortions are permissible so long as they are not
“undue”).
111 Currier, 940 F. Supp. 2d at 419 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-2\NDL211.txt

928

unknown

Seq: 16

notre dame law review

30-DEC-14

14:18

[vol. 90:2

would likely be upheld, no matter how many clinics such a regulation would
shut down when initially imposed. Simply finding an obstacle, then, is not
the end of the matter—finding whether that obstacle is truly substantial
requires inquiry not only into the cost of the regulation, but also that regulation’s legitimate benefits—as determined by the legislature, not the
courts.112 When courts step in to deny a state its policy discretion to favor
live childbirth or decide that a particular concern for the health of the
mother is not important enough to make abortion marginally more expensive, they inappropriately step into the role of the legislator; the judge
becomes an unelected policymaker. Whether or not the admitting privilege
requirement at issue in Currier actually protects the health of women seeking
abortions is a matter open to debate, but even if the court believes it has
solved that debate definitively, it should mention the matter in balancing
whether the burden is undue.
A second and related error occurs when the Currier court makes no
investigation into the state’s legitimate interest in promoting birth in its state
over abortion.113 Perhaps the state sought to encourage its citizens to choose
parenthood over abortion, which it has the authority to do under Casey.114
In Currier, the court has failed to balance the elements of the constitutional
question, instead seeking to completely focus on the burdens that the regulation will have on easy access to abortion.115 By turning the focus completely
off the legitimate concerns of the state and focusing entirely on the burdens
that personally concern the court, the court necessarily ignores the policy
values of legislators and elected officials, and replaces them with a judicial
fiat that burdens on abortion are unconstitutional if the judge subjectively
finds them to be “substantial.” Given that the Supreme Court has not spoken
more concretely on whether regulations affecting abortion providers and
clinics constitute an undue burden, judges should place far more emphasis
on legislatures’ policy preferences, not their personal values, in calculating
whether an obstacle to abortion access is truly substantial. If judges are will112 Note that this is the opposite outcome as was found in Okpalobi above. Okpalobi v.
Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 357 (5th Cir. 1999) (“A measure that has the effect of forcing all or a
substantial portion of a state’s abortion providers to stop offering such procedures creates
a substantial obstacle to a woman’s right to have a pre-viability abortion, thus constituting
an undue burden under Casey.”), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001)
(en banc) (reversing and remanding on procedural grounds).
113 Casey requires such an investigation. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877–78 (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (finding that the state had a legitimate interest in
promoting life).
114 Id.
115 For an example of a court coming to the same conclusion, but incorporating explicitly many of the same values that the Currier court did, see Planned Parenthood of Greater
Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 896–97 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (striking down an admitting privileges provision in statute while upholding other restrictions),
rev’d in part, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014). Note that the Texas district court explicitly
weighed the state’s legitimate ability to favor live birth over abortion and the related state’s
interest in protecting fetal life. Id.
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ing to entertain specific data points about clinic closures, they must also look
to specific statements from state legislators to fully understand the state’s
position on, and interest in, furthering maternal health and childbirth.
C.

Reliance on a Particular Market: Planned Parenthood
Southeast, Inc. v. Bentley

Some courts also rest their reasoning on the market for abortion services
in a particular state rather than on whether the legislature has a rational basis
for putting a restriction in place. In Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Bentley,116 the court granted a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of a provision requiring abortion practitioners to have admitting
privileges at a nearby hospital.117 In its analysis, the court suggests an interpretation of Casey whereby a provision that restricts abortion for a valid reason is acceptable even if it creates an “incidental inconvenience,” but that
such restrictions are invalid if they pose a substantial obstacle, despite being
rational.118 Using this reasoning, the court held that the restriction was invalid because it would close down three of the five abortion clinics in Alabama,
forcing some women to drive up to 200 miles for the procedure.119 This
would add the burden of both time and additional money to the cost of procuring an abortion.120 In reaching its conclusion, the court warned of the
potential elimination of abortion services in Alabama should the restriction
go into effect:
Such pressure [by the regulation] could render the consistent provision of
abortion services in Alabama a Sisyphean effort. The number of abortion
clinics in Alabama has already dwindled from seven to five in recent years.
Thus, while the court’s decision today hinges only on the three clinics imminently impacted by HB 57, the evidence raises the specter of an Alabama in
which women are unable to exercise this due-process right at all.121

The court relies on the fact that abortion clinics were closing in Alabama, and in so doing drags a disturbing factor into the undue burden
inquiry: the role the market for abortion plays in the court’s determination
that an undue burden exists.122 Federal courts have held that the govern116 951 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (M.D. Ala. 2013); cf. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex.
Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d 406, 415 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that in addition
to the challenged abortion restrictions, there are a number of unrelated reasons why
access to abortion in particular areas is scarce and disclaiming that these have any influence on an undue burden analysis), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013).
117 Bentley, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.
118 Id. at 1285.
119 Id. at 1286.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1288.
122 Though the courts do not have a responsibility to promote or ensure the viability of
abortion services, they cannot seek to eliminate the possibility of those services. When
courts are confronted with the possibility of shutting down access to all or most clinics in
the state, it puts them in a difficult position. Yet the solution to that situation is not simply
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ment is not responsible for propping up the abortion market, or fixing challenges for the abortion market.123 But is the state required to forego
imposing rational regulations on the abortion industry to keep it afloat
despite external forces? Governments may choose to lower restrictions on or
actively aid particular businesses as a policy choice to keep an industry alive
in their jurisdictions, but are they constitutionally required to do so for abortion clinics?124 What if those clinics closed down because so few women
wanted abortions, or because clinics could not afford to run sanitary operations? What impact does that have on the state’s abilities to keep women at
the still-operating clinics safe?
Pro-choice proponents argue that the market approach means each further restriction makes abortion harder to access, placing a substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion. Baselines, accordingly, would
be understood as a proxy for stating how much harder a law has made it to
procure an abortion. Yet there are many other factors involved in the undue
burden analysis, such as how many people live in an area, how many people
wish to have abortions in that area, the cost of keeping a sanitary facility, etc.
Why should the court leverage all these factors against legislation where the
intended effect is to promote women’s safety or fetal health? Courts avoid
answering these difficult questions in setting arbitrary baselines for themselves, and impermissibly bypass the balance Casey intended to strike between
protecting the decision to obtain an abortion and respecting the states’ legitimate interests in furthering maternal health and promoting fetal life.
D.

Choosing Judicially Created Policy over Legislatively Enacted Policy: Planned
Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen

While acknowledging legitimate state policy discretion under the Casey
analysis, courts can also fall into the trap of creating baselines regarding the
appropriate number of abortion providers in a state. Planned Parenthood of
to cite the fact that all clinics will be shut down in the state and call the burden “undue.”
Rather, what the standard developed in Casey asks the court to do is to acknowledge all of
the state’s interests in promoting parenthood and protecting the safety of the mother, and
weigh those against the gravity of the harm to the abortion right in shutting down all of the
clinics. Only once all of these rights have been acknowledged and properly weighed
should the court make a determination about whether the burden is “undue.”
123 See generally K.P. v. LeBlanc, 729 F.3d 427, 442 (5th Cir. 2013) (noting that “while
‘government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of
choice, it need not remove those’ obstacles” (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316
(1980))); Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 F.3d
406, 415 n.45 (5th Cir. 2013) (same), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 506 (2013).
124 I recognize the distinction between passively allowing the clinics to shut down and
creating a burden that causes clinics to close down, and I believe this comparison still
stands. That states do not need to actively save clinics recognizes a ceiling for requirements for the state, under which we know the proper responsibility of the state. The point
is that it is not as important that these clinics stay open as it is that the states are forced to
subsidize them. So how important is it that these clinics stay open? This question has been
left open by the Court, yet is critical for these courts in analyzing these types of decisions.
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Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen125 granted a preliminary injunction against a
Wisconsin state statute126 that required abortion practitioners to obtain
admitting privileges at a nearby hospital.127 In coming to its conclusion, the
court relied on the clinics’ arguments that they would be shut down in
absence of the injunction, as they were unable to comply with the admitting
privileges requirement.128 The closure of the plaintiffs’ clinics would likely
result in “reducing the availability of in-state abortion services by 69%.”129
The court balanced this increased burden on women’s access to abortion
with the potential medical benefits of hospital admitting privileges.130 Finding the overall benefit of admitting privileges wanting, the court struck down
the provision as unconstitutional.131
Although the court in Van Hollen applied the Casey undue burden analysis by acknowledging the legitimate state interests and balancing those
against the protection of a woman’s right to an abortion, the court still failed
to state a clear rationale for why the particular decrease in access to abortion
constitutes an undue burden. Metaphorically speaking, the court put the
right items on each side of the scale, but failed to explain why it ascribed to
each item the weight it did. Specifically, the court did not identify why the
closure of the clinics that provided sixty-nine percent of the state’s abortions
would amount to an undue burden. The court stated that the closure of the
clinics would lead to further travel, inconvenience, and increased costs.132
There can be no doubt, and surely few people would debate, that these costs
represent a burden on women seeking access to abortion in Wisconsin. What
the court fails to explain, however, is why that burden is undue: What about
reduced (not eliminated) access specifically constitutes an undue burden? Is
it simply because the court thinks that the benefits of admitting privileges is
“low” while the cost of having to drive an additional 100 miles each way is
“high?” Where does the court anchor these determinations? The only guid125 No. 13-cv-465-wmc, 2013 WL 3989238, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2013). The Seventh
Circuit upheld the permanent injunction on similar grounds as the trial court, particularly
noting the “feeble” medical grounds that the state had used to justify the statute. Planned
Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134
S. Ct. 2841 (2014). Yet, the Seventh Circuit’s holding in the case is far from developed.
126 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.10 (West 2014).
127 Van Hollen, 2013 WL 3989238, at *1, *19.
128 Id. at *2.
129 Id. at *17.
130 Id. at *19 (“[T]he court considers these obstacles in access to abortion services and
undue burden in light of the dubious benefits to women’s health of the admitting privileges restriction in Wisconsin.”).
131 Id.
132 Id. at *16 (“Along with gas, there are certainly other tangible costs to consider in
reducing geographical access to a substantial portion of Northern Wisconsin and the
Upper Peninsula of Michigan including payment for childcare and overnight accommodations and lost earnings. These costs are amplified given that the majority of patients are at
or below the federal poverty line.”). The court here primarily focused on the burden on
women’s access to abortion in the near term, avoiding any questions of women seeking
access elsewhere or the possibility of new clinics opening.
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ing light a judge has to make these decisions is her own personal values. For
judges who think that access to abortion services is morally praiseworthy, that
choice is an easy one. However, judges are not fit for these determinations of
policy. Nothing about law school or being appointed to the federal judiciary
makes someone uniquely better at policymaking than anyone else. The correct forums for these discussions are the legislatures to which citizens elect
representatives to make the law, not the judges who are appointed or elected
to interpret the law. Judges should leave the creation of the law to the legislators, who have the capacity to make those policy decisions and will be held
accountable for those decisions by the public. Casey acknowledges that
judges should not be policymakers,133 and correctly tells courts to uphold
laws for which the legislature has a rational basis, even where abortion access
is somewhat restricted.
E.

Legislatively Inspired Balancing: Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant

When courts do weigh a state’s reasonable interests in their constitutional balancing test under Casey, they often come out upholding regulations
on abortion clinics.134 The court in Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant135
undertook such a disciplined analysis and upheld as constitutional strict new
standards for abortion clinics.136 The regulations at issue were promulgated
by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control in
response to a state legislative measure that sought to license clinics that performed five or more first trimester abortions or any number of second tri133 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (joint opinion of
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.) (stating that the Court must use its “reasoned judgment” when interpreting the law, but that this does not “mean [it is] free to invalidate state
policy choices with which [it] disagree[s]”); id. at 965 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the “undue burden” standard because the standard is largely based on a judge’s subjective findings and personal views); id. at 999–1000
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“How upsetting it is, that so many of
our citizens . . . think that we Justices should properly take into account their views, as
though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some
kind of social consensus.”).
134 See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d
583, 590 (5th Cir. 2014) (recognizing the unitary interest in protecting “mothers’ and
children’s health” in upholding a Texas abortion regulation). For a case that considers the
legislature’s legitimate interests but ultimately strikes down a law, see Planned Parenthood
Se., Inc. v. Strange, No. 2:13cv405-MHT, 2014 WL 3809403, at *47 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 2014)
(“While the court finds that the State’s justifications for the law are weak, it must emphasize that its conclusion that the staff-privileges requirement is unconstitutional does not
turn solely on that finding. In the alternative, the court further finds that the justifications
are by no means sufficiently robust to justify the obstacles that the requirement would
impose on women seeking abortion.”). Although Strange does include a discussion of relevant interests at stake, it still fails to offer a principled account of why the scales tip in favor
of striking down the rule.
135 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
136 Id. at 159. The court in Greenville Women’s Clinic does not draw an arbitrary and
illegitimate baseline, as other courts do in cases identified throughout this Note.
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mester abortions.137 The regulations made operation of an abortion clinic
without a license illegal, set up regular inspections, and mandated certain
safety procedure requirements, laboratory medical tests, admitting privileges
or other transportation plans to a local hospital, medical reports, disaster
preparedness, daily sanitation and other cleanliness measures, building
design and equipment standards, some prerequisites, and certain “best practices.”138 Calculating the increased costs to abortion providers, delays in
access to abortion, increased travel distance, and patient privacy concerns,
the district court found that the regulations presented an undue burden to
women seeking abortions.139 Identifying the scope of the abortion right reaffirmed in Casey,140 the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and upheld
the abortion restrictions.141 In Greenville, the court determined an appropriately balanced baseline, taking into account the legitimate interests of the
state.142 While acknowledging that restrictions that “reach into the heart of
the liberty protected” are unconstitutional, the court allowed room for the
state to set its policy of protecting women and the unborn, despite increased
costs to those seeking abortions.143 To that end, the court remembered that
“[i]f a regulation serves a valid purpose—‘one not designed to strike at the
right itself’—the fact that it also has ‘the incidental effect of making it more
difficult or more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to
invalidate it.’ ”144 The court gave the state a great deal of leeway in making
abortion restrictions, finding that “[o]nly when the increased cost of abortion is prohibitive, essentially depriving women of the choice to have an abortion, has the Court invalidated regulations because they impose financial
burdens.”145 Setting aside situations in which the state groundlessly eliminates access through increased costs, the Fourth Circuit made a rule whereby
it would defer to the will of the legislature when the burden to women seeking abortions constituted merely some increased cost.146
137 Id. at 160.
138 Id. at 160–62.
139 Id. at 163. The lower court also found that the regulations unfairly “single[d] out”
abortion providers, violating their equal protection rights. Id. The circuit court overturned this ruling on appeal, finding that because the restrictions did not place an undue
burden on women, there would be no need to go into an equal protection and strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 173.
140 Id. at 165–66 (“The scope of [the abortion] right, however, is framed by the State’s
‘legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.))).
141 Id. at 159.
142 Id. at 165–66.
143 Id. at 166 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ.)).
144 Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
145 Id. at 167.
146 Id.
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The court applied the above rule to the regulations at issue in a manner
highly deferential to the state, accepting the values of duly elected officials
rather than trying to impose its own. The court also gave great weight to the
fact that the restrictions at issue were recognized and promulgated by the
American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the National Abortion Federation, and Planned Parenthood.147 Given the general acceptance
of these standards, upon which both parties agreed, the court found that the
restrictions were “reasonably designed to promote South Carolina’s valid
interest in women’s health.”148 This conclusion sufficiently convinced the
court that the restrictions were more than just an attempt to make abortion
harder to access—the restrictions rationally related to women’s health.149
That the law made these restrictions mandatory rather than merely voluntary,
which the abortion groups would have preferred, was controversial but did
not deter the court: “[t]he fact that not all healthcare professionals agree
with the adoption of each specific aspect of the Regulation is immaterial in
light of South Carolina’s ‘considerable discretion’ in adopting licensing
requirements aimed at the health of women seeking abortions.”150
Having favorably interpreted the restrictions in line with the state’s interest in protecting women, the court next looked at whether the restrictions
constituted an undue burden.151 In searching for what might make these
restrictions unduly burdensome, the court distinguished between “the ability
to make a decision to have an abortion” and “the financial cost of procuring an
abortion.”152 The reason behind this distinction was apparently that because
no women who had been prevented from having an abortion were joined in
this case, there was no actual proof that anyone had been prevented from
making the decision to obtain an abortion.153 Any statements about how
many women would be prevented from getting abortions would necessarily
be guesswork.154 Nevertheless, the court was willing to measure the
increased cost to get an abortion, and found it to be somewhere between $23
and $75, or possibly an additional seventy mile drive.155 The court considered such an increase in cost “modest when one considers that [the regulations’] purpose is to protect the health of women seeking abortions.”156
Therefore, the court found that the clinics had failed to prove the regula147 Id. at 167–68.
148 Id. at 168.
149 Id. at 170.
150 Id. at 169 (quoting Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 516 (1983) (“In view of its
interest in protecting the health of its citizens, the State necessarily has considerable discretion in determining standards for the licensing of medical facilities.”)).
151 Id. at 170–72.
152 Id. at 170.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 171.
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tions imposed an undue burden on women seeking abortions.157 The court
also determined that any other finding would have led to unacceptable
results:
To conclude that any of the figures in this case would place an obstacle in
the path of a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion would necessitate
the formulation of an arbitrary cost threshold beyond which a price increase
may not pass. This would irrationally hamstring the State’s effort to raise the
standard of care in certain abortion clinics, the procedures and facilities of
which do not adequately safeguard the health of their patients, simply
because the clinics’ performance falls so far below appropriate norms that
the expense of upgrading their practices and equipment exceeds the arbitrarily defined amount.158

As the court points out, for rational health regulations, the cost increases
will likely be the greatest for the worst clinics, further invalidating increased
costs for abortions as a legitimate method of determining when an abortion
is undue.159 Indeed, the closure of clinics or increased travel to clinics may
simply mean that such “eggshell” clinics nearby were never adequately safe.
Though the court oscillates between an interpretation of Casey, that if
any woman is prevented from procuring an abortion the restriction is unconstitutional, and strong deference to the state’s ability to protect women’s
health, the court ultimately embraces the latter line of reasoning. The
importance of this holding is that it identifies that any kind of strict line
drawing, besides gratuitous prohibition, on the part of the court for when a
burden caused by a restriction is undue would be arbitrary and involves the
court coopting the state’s prerogative in balancing the abortion right with
the importance of protecting women’s health. The court, following Casey,
allowed the state to regulate clinics while also following its duty in ensuring
that states do not impose restrictions on abortion that bear no rational relation to women’s health or the protection of fetal life. Greenville Women’s
Clinic represents the best lower court analysis of Casey so far, and should be
applied by other courts in judging abortion restrictions.160
157 Id. The court also concluded that the ability to inspect abortion facilities and copy
their documents also did not constitute an undue burden on the abortion facilities. Id.; see
also Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Baird, 438 F.3d 595, 605 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that
forcing women to drive a “reasonable distance” to obtain an abortion did not constitute an
undue burden); Fargo Women’s Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 533 (8th Cir. 1994)
(“Although the distance a woman must travel to obtain an abortion may be a factor in
obtaining an abortion, it is not a result of the state regulation. We do not believe a telephone call and a single trip, whatever the distance to the medical facility, create an undue
burden.”).
158 Greenville, 222 F.3d at 171.
159 Id.
160 But cf. Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We
depart from the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Greenville Women’s Clinic to the extent it
neglects that ‘[a] significant increase in the cost of obtaining an abortion alone can constitute an undue burden on the right to have an abortion.’” (quoting Greenville, 222 F.3d at
201 (Hamilton, J., dissenting))).
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Justice Scalia initially predicted the problem identified in this Note in
his dissent of the Casey decision.161 The problem he identified is that the
joint opinion in Casey essentially defined “undue burden” as “undue hindrance,” which provides no guidance on how lower courts should rule on
these issues.162 Scalia accurately portended, “[c]onsciously or not, the joint
opinion’s verbal shell game will conceal raw judicial policy choices concerning what is ‘appropriate’ abortion legislation.”163 As seen in Part II above,
this has been exactly the case with many judges, who often insert their policy
preferences in striking down legitimate state restrictions on abortion.164
The nebulousness of the undue burden standard also stems from its
varied application in different states, where the market for abortion and the
size of the state have an enormous impact on undue burden analysis. Such
distinguishing facts in each individual case can lead to potentially opposing
results, injecting an inherent vagueness in the Casey undue burden standard.
For example, in North Dakota, there is only one abortion clinic,165 so a
restriction that led to the closure of that clinic would result in women having
to travel out of state—a result the courts have found to be repugnant in the
past.166 Suppose that a theoretical law requires strict licensing provisions.
Such a law in North Dakota may result in that single clinic shutting down.
The same strict law in California, which boasts hundreds of abortion facilities,167 may result in the closure of many facilities, but still could end up not
increasing driving time or costs for anyone in California seeking an abortion.
The same law may create different burdens in different states, and in one
state the burden may be undue, while in the other the court may find it to be
due.
A proponent of the Casey standard might argue that such state-by-state
analysis is exactly what is needed to tailor judicial reasoning to the discrepan161 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985–87 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162 Id. at 987.
163 Id.; see supra cases discussed Part II.
164 See supra cases discussed Part II.
165 State Facts About Abortion: North Dakota, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher
.org/pubs/sfaa/north_dakota.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (“In 2011, there were [sic]
1 abortion providers in North Dakota; 1 of those were [sic] clinics. This represents no
change in overall providers and a no change in clinics from 2008, when there were [sic] 1
abortion providers overall, of which 1 were [sic] abortion clinics. In 2011, 98% of North
Dakota counties had no abortion clinic. 73% of North Dakota women lived in these
counties.”).
166 See, e.g., Jackson Women’s Health Org., Inc. v. Amy, 330 F. Supp. 2d 820, 827 (S.D.
Miss. 2004) (“[T]he court is not persuaded that this burden is adequately ameliorated by
the possible availability of abortions in surrounding states.”).
167 State Facts About Abortion: California, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher
.org/pubs/sfaa/california.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2014) (“In 2011, there were 512 abortion providers in California; 160 of those were clinics.”).
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cies in access and unique situations of each state. Yet, that makes guidance
for lower courts nearly impossible, as a statement of what is constitutional to
protect women’s health in one state, or at one time, may be unconstitutional
in another. For that reason, the holding in Casey (finding a 24-hour wait
period acceptable) may not necessarily transfer to states other than Pennsylvania. This kind of ambiguity or relativity in a legal standard is not necessarily untenable,168 but it does make it much more difficult for appeals
courts to guide the lower courts. Left to their own devices, many lower court
judges have improperly asserted their approbation of abortion into their
decisions, forcing out legitimate state interests that are protected under Casey
and other Supreme Court cases.
As exemplified in the cases discussed in Part II, judges often ignore
states’ limited constitutional prerogative as expressed in Roe and Casey to
favor parenthood over abortion.169 Some judges are apparently motivated by
an understanding that access to abortion has a social value that needs to be
protected. Although, to some extent, the holdings of Casey and Roe create a
constitutional policy in favor of more open access to abortion,170 that policy
preference is limited by the primary role of the state as the decider of how
much to prefer live birth over abortion.171 Additionally, the holding of Roe,
which was reaffirmed in Casey, strictly condemned any state preference of
unduly encouraging abortion, curtailing any policy in favor of pushing for
more abortions.172 That policy requirement goes for judges as well as legislatures. But when it comes down to making policy decisions regarding abortions, legislatures have a great deal of discretion, while the constitutional
structure leaves little room for judges to interfere.
Judges should not be in the business of guarding particular marketplaces.173 However, through the undue burden standard, Casey often thrusts
judges into making decisions regarding the appropriate condition of the
abortion market in particular states. Regrettably, when a confluence of laws
and other circumstances happen to reduce the market for abortion in a
state,174 judges have insufficient guidance for which of the laws causing the
market change to strike down. Restrictive abortion regulations may, for
example, have valuable effects individually, but due to their quantity, may
have the effect of placing substantial obstacles in the path of women seeking
abortions. Which of the laws creating the obstacle is the judge to strike down
as unconstitutional? Laws that arguably offer scant benefits in the way of
168 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (“It is
axiomatic that a statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as
applied to another.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
170 Assuming that constitutionally protected rights are favored as a matter of policy
under the Constitution.
171 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
173 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
174 See supra cases cited Part II.
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protecting fetal and maternal health but cause great hardships for abortion
providers may be easy targets.175 Ultimately, without proper explanation of
judicial decisionmaking and without full analysis of the rights at issue, court
decisions will necessarily be flawed and incongruous, leaving poor precedent
for future cases and a poor analysis for cases on appeal.176
More generally, how should courts think about the market effects of
abortion regulations? Take the hypothetical clean instruments example
above,177 where the resulting market effect of a requirement that all abortion
providers use clean instruments would be to shut down all of the abortion
clinics in the state.178 In such situations, must courts use the current level of
abortion access or abortion numbers as their baselines in these determinations? What about having to drive an additional 200 miles makes a burden
on abortion access undue? There is no objective value that can be ascribed
to the burdens placed on women in this situation. Simply put, courts are
viewing these facts and independently interpreting those facts unguided by
statute or precedent. In doing so, the courts are misinterpreting Casey and
coming to results inconsistent with its holding.
In thinking about judicially created baselines, it is helpful to consider
other medical procedures where the state may regulate medical providers in
order to ensure safety or meet some other policy goal. One need not look
just to medical procedures generally, but even to comparable types of procedures such as hysterectomies. States may regulate these procedures, but cannot unduly regulate them. Abortion is not special in this regard and there is
no legal justification for protecting it over these other, sometimes medically
required, procedures. In writing decisions on the matter of abortion, judges
should accept reasonable restrictions on abortions aimed at promoting the
health of patients as they would for any other medical procedure.
The importance of judicial clarity is not limited or unique to the abortion context. Yet this field of law, largely dominated by the vague Casey standard,179 demands a higher level of judicial candor. In many instances, this
may require the courts to write lengthier opinions to accommodate all sides
of the issue. By bringing out into the open the values put onto the Casey
balancing scales, judges and justices will strengthen their written opinions
and function as more appropriate actors within our constitutional system.

175 See, e.g., supra Part II (discussing the doctor’s admitting privileges).
176 While findings of law are usually reviewed de novo, findings of law in lower court
cases often still play an important role in appellate court analysis.
177 See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
178 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged but ultimately refused to engage with such a hypothetical raised by the state in the appeal of Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 1360599, 2014 WL 3730467, at *9 (5th Cir. July 29, 2014). Instead, the court decided to
remain focused on the facts of the case at bar. Id.
179 See supra Part III.
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CONCLUSION
The Casey undue burden standard creates an exceptionally vague standard that is ripe for judicial abuse. One such example of that abuse occurs
when judges create arbitrary baselines for minimum abortion services and
insert personal values into opinions at the expense of legitimate state concerns. For the sake of legal clarity and better decisionmaking, judges should
strive to undo this trend by fully balancing the competing issues, respecting
the state legislatures’ legitimate prerogatives in the matter of abortion, and
refraining from setting baselines for what they deem to be the right number
of abortions in their jurisdictions.
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